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ABSTRACT 
 
The establishment of the EU emission trading scheme (EU ETS) has internalised 
climate change risk into carbon risk, to which companies are becoming increasingly 
exposed. Understanding the market is essential for good risk management. However, 
the many uncertainties present in the market are difficult to grasp and make it hard to 
quantify the risk. The main purpose of this thesis is to gauge the factors affecting the 
market participants’ carbon risk exposure and provide insight for hedging the carbon 
risk in Phase II and III of the EU ETS.  
The first part of this study analyses different uncertainties and scenarios in the carbon 
market and evaluates their impact for the future development. Special attention is given 
to institutional factors as the most relevant risk drivers in the mid-term perspective. In 
the second part, the cost-of-carry model is tested together with cointegration analysis 
between the European Union Allowances (EUA) and Certified Emission Reduction 
(CER) spot and futures prices, futures being the most liquid hedging instrument. The 
results here are mixed. While no cointegration can be proved with certainty in the case 
of EUA, the CER spot and futures are clearly cointegrated, although definitely not 
through a cost-of-carry relationship 
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Abbreviations and Significant Terms 
 
 
Annex I countries – Industrialised countries that have agreed to reduce their greenhouse 
gas emissions by signing the UNFCCC. 
 
Annex II countries – Developed countries responsible for bearing the costs of climate 
change mitigation in developing countries. Subset of Annex I countries. 
 
Annex B countries – Countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol and have 
committed to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by a certain percentage (compared 
to their 1990 levels) by the end of the period 2008-2012. 
 
AAU – Assigned Amount Units, which are emission permits assigned to countries 
under the Kyoto Protocol. These can be traded between countries, and are also used to 
offset issued project credits. 
 
Bankability – Possibility to transfer allowances and project credits from one period to 
another. 
 
CER – Certified Emission Reductions, which are emission permits obtained from the 
CDM projects, each allowing emission of 1 tonne carbon dioxide equivalents. 
 
ERU – Emission Reduction Units, which are emission permits obtained from the JI 
projects, each allowing emission of 1 tonne of carbon dioxide equivalents. 
 
EUA – emission permit issued and traded within the EU ETS, each allowing emission 
of 1 tonne of carbon dioxide equivalents. 
 
Installation – a single emitting entity such as a factory or a power plant.    
 
UNFCCC – The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
1 
Introduction 
 
The first mandatory carbon emission market – the European Union Emission Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS) – was implemented in 2005 to fulfil the goals set in the Kyoto 
Protocol in 1997 to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases in Europe. Target for EU-
15 is an average reduction of CO2 emissions of 8% between 2008 and 2012 compared 
to the 1990 base year level (EEA 2008). Moreover, the EU has taken a leading role in 
mitigating carbon emissions and has further set a goal of a 20% reduction compared to 
the 1990 level by 2020 in EU-27, or even 30% provided that a satisfactory global 
agreement is achieved in the post-Kyoto period. One effect of this policy is the rise of a 
so-called carbon risk due to the uncertain future costs of CO2 emissions for companies.  
The European energy and industrial companies with “installations”, i.e. production 
units included in the EU ETS, are experiencing increasing carbon risk exposure and 
uncertainties related to the development of the carbon markets, which definitely creates 
a need for careful risk assessment and actions to be taken accordingly.  
Emission trading in the EU is organized into three phases, the first in 2005-2007 (Phase 
I), the second 2008-2012 (Phase II) and the third 2013-2020 (Phase III), with to some 
extent varying rules. Currently, sectors obliged to cover their emission with permits 
under the EU ETS are energy activities, production and processing of ferrous metals, 
and the mineral and pulp and paper industries (Annex I, 2003/87/EC). However, 
several emission-intensive sectors are going to be added to the scheme.  
While the first phase was characterised by generous grandfathering (free allocation) of 
most permits to most installations, the total amount of allocated permits during the 
second period is lower and more uneven among installations. One extreme example is 
the Swedish energy sector, which did not receive any grandfathered permits, meaning 
that it has to buy all permits in the market. Although somewhat uncertain, the plan is to 
auction off a large share of permits in the third phase. Utilities are the most affected as 
they are the number one source of emissions, almost 40% in the EU (EEA 2009) and as 
they are not directly exposed to international competition; they do not receive the same 
political support for protection as the energy-intensive industry.  
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Due to the emergence of regulation of carbon emissions also in other parts of the world 
(e.g. in the US and Australia), carbon risk will become important for an increasing 
number of companies. It can be noted though that some companies already pay to some 
extent for their emissions, mostly through voluntary emission trading schemes as a 
result of their corporate social responsibility policies.  
From an efficiency point of view, it is important that the continuation of a trading 
scheme is guaranteed. However, there are many uncertainties, both about the design of 
the EU ETS and the global market, which are largely dependent on the 15th Conference 
of the Parties (COP15) to the Kyoto Protocol in Copenhagen in December 2009.  
Take, for example, a production portfolio of an electricity producer. Being long in 
electricity and short in emission allowances (and often other production inputs) can, 
according to the portfolio theory, be preferable to a fully hedged position in carbon – at 
least to some point before the reporting date. However, high volatilities and recent 
unstable correlations between these commodities imply that there might be a necessity 
for different kind of hedging strategies.  
The purpose of this study is to analyse the EU emission trading scheme and provide 
insight for carbon risk management in the rest of Phase II and Phase III. The EU carbon 
market is still relatively young, which limits the quantitative studies and their 
interpretation. Moreover, there are considerable changes expected in the market. This 
paper therefore will evaluate the sources of uncertainty in the EU ETS and examine the 
relationship between the emission permits’ spot and futures prices in order to give some 
insight into how good of a hedge the most liquidly traded instruments really provide.  
The paper is structured as follows: the first part gives a brief overview of the market; 
the second part brings out the most important risk factors in the ‘foreseeable future’ of 
the carbon market, and the third part tests the cost-of-carry model and the cointegration 
between spots and futures in the European Union Allowances (EUA) and the Certified 
Emission Reductions (CER) markets.  
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1. Carbon Market Background 
 
The EU ETS or the EU domestic emission trading scheme is closely related to the other 
mechanisms created under the Kyoto Protocol. The relationships are explained in Table 
1. 
 
  
Kyoto Protocol 
  
  Project Based Mechanisms Emission Trading 
  
LULUCF CDM JI Domestic International 
Programs / Basic 
assumptions 
Land Use, Land 
Use Change and 
Forestry 
(LULUCF) 
Clean 
Development 
Mechanism 
(CDM) 
Joint 
 Implementation  
(JI) 
Example: 
European Union 
Emission Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS) 
International 
Securities RMU CER ERU EUA AAU 
Explanation of 
the acronym 
Removal Unit Certified 
Emission 
Reduction 
Emission Reduction 
Unit 
European Union 
Allowances 
Assigned 
Amount Unit 
Responsible 
body 
Government of the 
host country 
CDM Executive 
Board 
Government of the 
host country 
Governments of 
the EU member 
states 
Governments of 
countries that 
have ratified the 
Protocol 
Conditions for 
issuing 
Net removals by 
sinks from the 
land use, land use 
change and 
forestry sector. 
Afforestation, 
reforestation and 
deforestation 
activities.  
Investing in a 
project in a 
country that 
does not have 
any 
commitments 
towards the 
Protocol i.e. a 
developing 
country. 
  Investing in a 
project in another 
Annex I country 
(Kyoto compliant), 
other than the 
country of origin. 
Usually economies 
in transition. ERUs 
issued from the host 
countries' AAU 
reserve. 
 In Phase I and II 
according to 
National Allocation 
Plans (taking into 
account targets 
set in the Kyoto 
Protocol). In 
Phase III EU wide 
emission gap. 
According to the  
cap set for the 
installations in 
countries that 
have ratified the 
Protocol. 
    Traded in (at least some phases of) EU ETS    
Table 1 
Overview of the Kyoto Protocol and Flexible Mechanisms (compiled based on UNFCCC, 
2009; EEA, 2008; and Labatt and White, 2007) 
All carbon emission permits are commodities by nature. The variation in spot prices 
and daily returns are illustrated in Appendices 1 and 2, with the annualised volatility of 
daily returns being 58% in Phase II (for comparison, the number for FTSE Europe is 
37% and for the daily average prices of electricity on NordPool it is 101%).  
  
4
Worldwide, the carbon markets are rapidly developing – the volume increased 1.7 
times from 2006 to 2007. In 2007, allowance markets accounted for 70.7% by volume 
(78.7% by value) of the total carbon markets, with the EU ETS being the largest of 
these both by volume and value with 97.7% and 99.4%, respectively. The rest of the 
transactions were made on project-based markets, with Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) being by far the largest. (Capoor and Ambrosi 2008) 
Up until 2012 (in the 2nd phase), the largest source of emission allowances will be the 
free allocations specified in the National Allocations Plans submitted by the member 
states to the European Commission. The surpluses or shortages of EUAs can be traded 
on the secondary market. Alternatively, credits from project-flexible mechanisms can 
be used. However, mandated installations included in the EU ETS cannot surrender for 
compliance more than 1400 million CERs and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) or 
13.4% of the total number of allowances during Phase II (Capoor and Ambrosi 2008). 
The project-based credits can, in addition to being directly invested in CDM and Joint 
Implementation (JI) projects in other countries, also be purchased on exchanges. 
After 2012, the markets will (according to the proposals by the Commission) function 
in essentially the same way, except for that a large part of the EU allowances will be 
auctioned off to the companies. The electricity sector will be the one most affected by 
this, since these companies will have to pay for all of their emissions. However, for all 
companies in the trading system, there is an opportunity cost of the emission permits 
although it may vary depending on the allocation rules (see Hjalmarsson 2008). 
In order to proceed with estimating the factors influencing the carbon exposure for the 
companies under the EU ETS it is necessary to point out different options that can be 
used to meet the compliance requirements. In principle, the companies have three 
options: abate their emissions, invest in less carbon-intensive production facilities or 
use carbon emission permits to offset the emitted CO2. 
This paper deals with the development and risks associated with the third option and 
consider the first two only to the extent necessary to gauge the impact on supply and 
demand in the trading scheme. 
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2. Factors Driving the Carbon Market 
 
At present, there are many uncertainties related both to the development of the EU ETS 
and to the other regional or country-based emission trading schemes and their links to 
the former. Some of these contingencies will be resolved via negotiations in December 
2009; others further in the future. This chapter qualitatively discusses risk exposure 
related to the movements in the CO2 price.   
 
2.1 Supply and Demand 
 
One of the most fundamental factors is the cap set for the scheme, or the supply of 
allowances. Setting an accurate cap is important for the efficiency of the system by 
establishing a price for emitting that creates incentives for emission reductions at about 
the same marginal cost as the marginal abatement costs in the economy outside the 
trading system, while at the same time meeting the Kyoto objective. The subsections 
that follow evaluate the most relevant factors for the supply-demand balance.   
2.1.1 Market Fundamentals  
 
Since the electricity sector is the biggest consumer of EUAs, there is an 
interrelationship between European electricity prices and permit prices. As shown in 
Appendix 4, there is a strong correlation between different emission intensive energy 
commodities and EUA. Mansanet Bataller et al. (2006) found that temperature can also 
somewhat explain EUA returns – but only when there are extreme weather conditions. 
The increasing use of renewable energy (e.g. wind, hydro and tidal energy) in Europe 
will probably increase the impact of weather. For example, low temperatures will 
increase the consumption of heat and electricity produced from emission-intensive 
resources. Especially wind power with stochastic supply will increase the demand for 
regulation (back-up) capacity, which, if not enough hydro power is available, will be 
supplied by thermal power.  
The relationship between energy commodity prices and carbon prices is rather intuitive. 
Firstly, again, coal, gas and oil are inputs in the electricity production. Secondly, oil 
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prices are related to the economic cycles, which are directly linked to the output of the 
industrial companies under the EU ETS and their demand for emission allowances. 
2.1.2 Market Sentiment 
   
The perception and expectations about the supply-demand balance, and consequently 
the price, can vary remarkably between the market participants and deviate from the 
efficient price or actual spot prices. This is more important perhaps in the context of 
Phase II, as it is predictable only in the shorter term and related to the fact that the 
market is still relatively immature. The past has shown that risk aversion and herd 
behaviour can cause wide price swings in the market. The power and heat sectors were 
short of allowances in Phase I, while the overallocation in iron and steel and in cement 
were roughly 24% and 7%, respectively (Antes et al. 2008). Nevertheless, industrial 
companies, being risk averse, were reluctant to sell in the beginning of the phase, which 
resulted in relatively high price levels (Schieldrop 2009). Then, in Phase II, it was the 
industrial companies that supplied the market with permits, due to their liquidity 
problems (ibid.), although their reserves were not as abundant as they had been 
previously.    
Yet, Daskalakis and Markellos (2008) argue that it is the power producers who have the 
upper hand in the market. Firstly, they are in a better position to more accurately 
calculate the overall market position and therefore to exploit any potential inefficiency 
and, secondly, exert market power either individually or through tacit collusion and can 
therefore manipulate the market. 
2.1.3 Changes in Technology and Production 
 
Abatement possibilities through production changes can be divided into short-term and 
long-term options. In the shorter term, fuel switching, which is mainly used to mean 
changing from coal to natural gas, is used to minimise production costs. However, 
since it is not possible to cover all the energy needs in Europe with gas, other 
abatement and emission reduction opportunities should be considered.  
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Renewable Energy 
 
The climate-energy legislative package, adopted by the European Council on 6 April 
2009, sets a target of a 20% share of energy from renewable sources in the EU's final 
consumption of energy (up from about 9% today) and a 10% share of energy from 
renewable sources in each member state's transport energy consumption by 2020. 
Direct investment subsidies, Feed-in Tariffs and Green Certificate Markets have been 
set up by individual member states to promote this development. In addition to 
reducing the impacts on the climate, incentives for promoting the use of renewables 
have emerged also with reference to energy supply security. To what extent improved 
energy security is achieved and whether it is worth the high cost and subsidies linked to 
renewables is an open question  
As previously mentioned, renewables are more weather dependent, making the supply 
of electricity more unpredictable. For example, in the case of low wind or precipitation 
levels, producers need to switch to fossil fuels. In spite of having a decreasing effect on 
the demand for allowances in the long term, they do increase the price volatility of the 
allowances.  
Nuclear Energy 
 
Nuclear energy, being carbon emission free, is becoming increasingly appealing in the 
light of the expected allowance deficit and price hikes. After having long been a 
politically less attractive option, there has been an emerging interest in nuclear power 
in several countries since the turn of the century. Other favouring factors include 
increasing energy demand, security of supply, and relative cost effectiveness. Since 
most of the increase in nuclear capacity (over 80%) is expected to occur in developed 
countries that already use nuclear power (WNA 2007), the demand for permits will be 
affected significantly. On the other hand, long building cycles and a lack of necessary 
legislation in some countries will limit the use of nuclear energy in the near future. 
Working in the opposite direction, i.e. increasing demand for emission permits, would 
be a decommissioning of nuclear power in Germany. If it is realised, most nuclear 
power production will probably be substituted by natural gas from Russia (through the 
politically controversial Nord Stream pipeline in the Baltic Sea) increasing annual 
emissions by 40-50 Mton CO2 (this may be compared to the present German allocation 
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quota of about 500 Mton or the Swedish allocation quota of about 22 Mton per year) 
(Hjalmarsson 2009).  
Carbon Capture and Storage 
 
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) gives great hope for a carbon free technology. In 
September 2008, Vattenfall opened its first power plant to incorporate CCS at 
Schwarze Pumpe in Germany (Economist 2009) and CCS operations at the Sleipner 
offshore platforms in the North Sea began already in 1996 (Cappelen and Corrigan 
2008). Hence, the technology for implementing this kind of abatement is available, 
though the long-term prospects are still uncertain.  The biggest hurdle is commercial 
viability – it is by far the most expensive form of abatement, and hence requires 
sufficiently high and stable allowance prices to penetrate the market. Although, the EU 
has decided to support up to 12 CCS demonstration projects from the new entrant 
reserve in Phase III (COD(2008)0013),  widespread use of CCS is not expected to be 
realised until after Phase III. 
2.1.4 Interaction Between Different Flexible Mechanisms  
 
One of the sources affecting the supply-demand balance at least in the Kyoto period 
(2008-2012) is the trading of Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) between governments; 
see Table 1. According to Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, countries with AAU 
surpluses can sell them to countries with deficits. The demand from 2008 to 2012 will 
be driven primarily by the Japanese and the EU-15 governments (Ramming 2008), 
while Russia, the Ukraine and Poland have the largest surpluses (EBRD 2009). These 
kinds of excessive government purchases of AAUs imply that the demand for project 
certificates (CER and ERU) will decline, leading to a decrease in their prices and also 
in EUA price. However, the impact on the EUA price would probably be somewhat 
smaller due to limits on using the project credits in the EU ETS. The requirement of 
‘greening’ of AAUs imposed on the sellers by buyers and existence of Green 
Investment Schemes will ensure that proceeds from such trades are used to further 
mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions or to support other environmental activities 
(GIS Manual, 2009). This will probably not allow the countries to close their entire 
Kyoto gaps (the difference between the target specified in the Kyoto Protocol and 
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actual emissions) with AAUs. However, as Ramming (2008) also mentions, this 
scenario would be more likely if there were no future global climate agreement. 
CDM, as an alternative to AAU’s, can also affect the prices within the EU ETS, as the 
CERs (and also ERUs) are accepted as emission offsets in the EU ETS. Previously, the 
projects invested in, that have been expected to yield CERs, have in many cases been 
delayed due to overload at the CDM registry (Capoor and Ambrosi 2008), also directly 
affecting the demand from the private sector. Moreover, there are other risks associated 
with participating in a CDM project or purchasing primary CERs (i.e. permits that are 
not yet officially issued), such as counterparty, carbon regulatory, country, technology 
performance, business interruption and other risks (Labatt and White 2007), which may 
jeopardise the arrival of the permits.     
 
2.2 Institutional aspects 
 
The EUA market in Phase II is more sensitive to changes in demand, as the rules and 
allocations have been already set. For Phase III, though, many uncertainties still persist, 
which will be largely decided upon by the middle of 2010. The most relevant risk 
factors are highlighted below. 
2.2.1 Auctioning Mechanism 
 
Moving to auction-based allocation rule rather than just distributing allowances for free 
has two major advantages. Firstly, an auction can raise revenue that can substitute for 
other taxes, thereby lowering the social cost of new regulation (Goulder et al. 1999, in 
Ǻhman et al. 2007), and secondly, in regulated markets, an auction tends to reduce the 
difference between price and marginal cost, again providing potential cost savings 
(Burtraw et al. 2001; Parry, 2005, in Ǻhman et al. 2007). In Phase III, 88% of the 
allowances for auctioning will be distributed to Member States on the basis of their 
emissions in the period of 2005-2007 (EU 2009). 
Using auctions to allocate allowances has important implications for the secondary 
market, especially in the light of a rigid cap. Since the positions will be covered from 
the auctions, the secondary market could become fairly thin (Benz et al. 2008), unless 
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the market will attract speculators. If not very liquid, market price might not reflect the 
efficient price of the allowances.  
Therefore, the design of the auctioning system is important, as it will play a role in the 
price discovery in the market. There are, however, still considerable uncertainties left in 
the market regarding the rules of auctioning in Phase III, which the European 
Commission has promised to clarify only by 30 June 2010 (EU 2009). 
2.2.2 Additional GHGs and sectors added to the EU ETS  
 
Aviation and Maritime Emissions 
 
The aviation industry, which accounts for 1.9-2.4% of global emissions (Committee on 
Climate Change 2009), will be included in the EU ETS in 2012 (2008/101/EC). 
However, the companies will have their own permits – AEUAs – although they will 
also be allowed to purchase from the EUA market. Though the aviation industry will 
most likely be short in allowances, this will probably not affect the price of EUA 
significantly. Preparations to also include the shipping industry have started as well 
(COM(2008)0017). Shipping represents about 4.5% of total global GHG emissions 
based on 2007 data, but is currently outside the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Warris and Lightburn, 2008). 
 
Additional Greenhouse Gases Included  
 
The climate-energy legislative package regulates additional (1) industries 
(petrochemicals, ammonia and aluminium) and (2) greenhouse gases (nitrous oxide 
from nitric, adipic, and glyoxylic acid production facilities and perfluorocarbons from 
the aluminium industry). 
According to EU-wide rules, these industries will receive allowances mostly free of 
charge, in the same way as industries that are already covered. Gauging the impact of 
this is extremely difficult, however. If anything, these industries will probably be net 
long rather than short as they could be subject to carbon leakage.  
The capture, transport and geological storage of all greenhouse gas emissions will also 
be covered in Phase III (see section 2.1.3). 
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Including additional sectors (such as maritime) later to the scheme will probably 
increase the price of allowances, as adjusting the supply side is not a recommended 
action (to guarantee the reliability of the system), which in itself does not mean that it 
will not be used. While the cap, or reductions of a 20% of emissions, in case of no-
agreement scenario is already written into legislation, in case of a satisfactory global 
agreement (with reductions of 30%) the supply of permits can still be adjusted to some 
extent by the amount of project credits allowed into the system, depending on the 
course of negotiations.  
2.2.3 Linking  
 
Enlargement of the market can occur in two ways: through global harmonisation of the 
market and by linking to other systems. In mid term, linking is more feasible. Linking 
refers to any use of credits or allowances from outside the system for compliance i.e. 
the use of anything other than the system’s own allowances (Ellerman and Joskow 
2008). Thus, it covers both the project flexible mechanisms as well as linking different 
schemes to the EU ETS.  
 
Linking to Flexible Mechanisms  
 
The EU Commission has stated in COM(2008)16 that the limit on project credits in 
Phase III will remain the same as in Phase II unless a satisfactory international 
agreement is reached in December 2009. If an agreement is reached, then reduction in 
emissions by 30% (instead of 20%) will increase the need for additional CERs and 
ERUs making it possible to increase the quota without undermining the EU objective to 
increase the use of renewable energy. 
 
Linking to Other Emission Trading Schemes 
 
The expectations in this regard are foremost related to three large developed federal 
states: the United States, Australia and Canada (and also their regional initiatives). 
However, there are several possible impediments to linking: when targets, proportion of 
free allocations and the market infrastructure differ between the schemes, then (a) 
division of reduction cost can become unfair (Rix and Paul 2008), and (b) it can be 
difficult to reach individual targets (also in terms of the EU renewable energy policy, 
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for example). On the other hand, there are benefits from linking, such as a potentially 
lower aggregate cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, increased liquidity and 
reduced price volatility (COD(2008)0013), which do seem appealing to EU authorities. 
However, linking requires some extent of harmonising, especially in banking, 
allocation rules, monitoring-reporting and emission targets (Zaman 2005).  Moreover, 
there is another necessary condition that has to be satisfied – existence of other 
mandatory cap and trade schemes. For example, while ten US states have already set up 
their scheme (the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative) (RGGI 2009), the federal 
government has been rather cautious on this issue. The EU readiness for linking is also 
shown in the fact that a clause was added to the adopted climate-energy package 
allowing not only linking between independent states but also regional carbon emission 
exchanges. Any kind of linking would be desirable from a private sector perspective as 
the main impact would almost certainly be lower costs. 
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3. The Futures Market 
 
It is evident from the previous discussion that the carbon price volatility and the 
unpredictable developments in the market create a necessity to hedge the risk. Since 
futures are the most liquid and accessible instruments to date, it is important to assess 
whether the futures market offers effective hedging opportunities i.e. whether futures 
and the underlying assets follow the same trend or process, which is especially 
important from a portfolio management perspective. In addition, this chapter will 
discuss the pricing issues. First, the cost-of-carry model is used on EUA in order to 
determine the existence of convenience yields and to provide an introduction for the 
subsection that follows: Cointegration between spot and futures, performed both on 
EUA and CER.  
 
3.1 Theory and Previous Research 
3.1.1 The Cost-of-Carry Model and Convenience Yields 
 
Commodities are generally divided into two subgroups: investment assets (e.g. gold 
and silver) and consumption assets (e.g. oil). The difference is that the latter is used in a 
production process, which usually makes it more desirable to hold a long position in the 
spot in order to meet unexpected demand shocks or to profit from local shortages. (Hull 
2000)  
The cost-of-carry model thus posits that the futures price should equal the spot price, 
adjusted for the opportunity cost of holding a spot position (Milunovich and Joyeux 
2007). Hence, the no-arbitrage assumption, adjusted to the short-selling constraints for 
a consumption commodity, stipulates the following relationship between futures and 
spot prices:  
                        
))((
,
tTyur
tTt eSF
−−+=                                     (1) 
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where, St is the spot price, T-t is time to maturity and r is the risk free interest rate. 
Specific for commodities are storage cost, u, and convenience yield, y. The latter is the 
benefit from holding the consumption assets. 
Since emission allowances do not physically exist and are stored in the Community 
International Transaction Log, no significant storage or inventory costs occur from 
holding the asset except the time value of money which is lost due to the cash held in 
the permits. Hence, the only possible difference between the spot price and the 
discounted futures price in case of emission allowances is the (gross) convenience 
yield.  
Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner (2007) also point out that since spot EUAs are only 
needed once a year to fulfil compliance requirements, then if futures mature before the 
end of the next compliance date, there is no benefit in holding spot EUAs compared to 
holding the corresponding long futures position. Thus, the convenience yield one year 
prior to the expiration of a future should equal 0. 
The implied convenience yield (assuming 0 storage costs) is derived from the previous 
formula, the equation (1): 
                          )(
)/ln(
tT
SF
ry tttt −
−=                                    (2) 
 
Several studies on other markets have shown that there exists a relationship between 
the convenience yield and some exogenously given variables, such as the inventory 
stock (e.g. Heaney 2002). In this case, the convenience yield itself may be stochastic 
and, if so, will weaken the link between the spot and futures prices (Uhrig-Homburg 
and Wagner 2007).  
Previous research on the cost-of-carry model, based on EUA Phase I data, has revealed 
mixed results. Daskalakis, Psychoyios and Markellos (2009), based only on the mean 
squared error, found that futures prices for the Phase I futures evolved according to the 
cost of carry model with no significant convenience yields. Further, Uhrig-Homburg 
and Wagner (2007) claimed the same, for the period after December 2005, using 
cointegration analysis. In contrast Milunovich and Joyeux (2007) rejected the cost-of-
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carry approach for all futures traded in Phase I by also using cointegration analysis, 
claiming that violation of the cost-of-carry relation can be interpreted as an indicator of 
market inefficiency and pointing to arbitrage opportunities in the market.  
3.1.2 Cointegration between Spot and Futures Prices 
 
Rewriting the cost-of-carry model in (1), it is easy to see that according to the theory 
there must be one-to-one linear relationships between the natural logarithmic values of 
spot and futures prices:  
 
             )()(lnln tTytTrSF tttt −−−+=                           (3) 
 
Thus, in the case of sufficiently stable convenience yield and interest rate values (or, 
alternatively, including them) cointegration analysis can be used to shed light on the 
long-run relationship between the variables.  
Although risk management techniques are largely based on correlation, these can be 
highly volatile and do not give an adequate picture in the long term of the actual 
relationship between asset prices. This can be complemented by cointegration analysis, 
which attempts to identify common driving factors in stochastically trending data, thus 
identifying long-run equilibrium relationships between economic variables 
(Hjalmarsson and Österholm 2007). From a risk management point of view, it is 
important that there exists a relationship between spot and futures – in order for futures 
to be an effective hedging instrument. Moreover, cointegration analysis could provide 
insight into questions regarding which asset reacts first to the exogenous shocks and 
how quickly prices converge to the mean-reverting equilibrium level.  
A necessary condition for testing cointegration between two or more variables is that 
the variables are integrated at least at the order of one, I(1), meaning that taking the 
respective number of differences (at least one) would make the series stationary. When 
this is satisfied, a vector error correction model (VECM), proposed by Engle and 
Granger (1987), can be fitted in order to test short term dynamics and causality in the 
relationship. The simplest, bivariate model, in the case of spot and futures prices can be 
expressed as: 
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where ∆lnSt and ∆lnFt are changes in logarithmic values of spot and futures prices, 
respectively, and ut-1 is the lagged error term from the cointegrating vector, reflecting 
deviations from the long-term equilibrium relationship (estimated by the ordinary least 
squares): 
 
             ttt uSF ++= lnln 10 γγ                                  (5) 
 
For more sophisticated analyses or relationships, adding variables to the cointegrating 
vector and equations with respective variables to the system can augment the test. 
When studying futures prices, then evidently these variables could be the interest cost 
and the convenience yield. The latter, even though not observable, can in some cases be 
modelled. VECM estimates the impact of the lagged error terms and of the lagged first 
differences of the variables on each of the variables individually. In other words, it 
estimates whether there exists any lead-lag relationships between the variables. 
There are more sophisticated tests developed after Engle and Granger. One of them is 
the Johansen test, which is used to test the number of cointegrating relationships 
between certain variables. The Johansen test seeks the linear combination that is most 
stationary (based on the eigenvalues of a stochastic matrix) whereas the Engle-Granger 
is based on the minimum variance. (Maddala and Kim 1998) 
The studies on cointegration in the EUA market in Phase I are more unanimous than 
those on the cost-of-carry model, though cointegration testing is usually coupled with 
the previous concept. The published studies state a link between EUA spot and futures 
prices, implying that the Phase I futures were suitable instruments for hedging CO2. 
Milunovich and Joyeux (2007) show that there was bi-directional Granger causality 
between the spot and futures prices. In contrast, Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner (2007), 
studying almost identical time periods, argue that the EUA futures market led the price 
discovery process. Thus, at least in Phase I, the EUA shared more characteristics with 
financial assets (in which case it has been proved that futures generally drive the spot 
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market) than with commodities. In addition, lead-lag relationships were present even 
with daily data, which contradicts the efficient functioning of the market, according to 
which information should be revealed in the prices contemporaneously.  
3.2 Data  
 
The standard futures contracts on European exchanges are annual contracts, since the 
allowances and offsets are required to be surrendered only once a year by April. All 
EUA and CER futures listed on NordPool (similarly to EEX and Bluenext) mature 
every year at the beginning of December, up until 2012. In addition, there are March 
contracts available on NordPool before the next compliance date.  
The data used in this paper for the empirical part on EUA, CER futures prices and 
electricity prices was provided by NordPool. The CER spot price was obtained from 
the BlueNext exchange through Datastream. All the other time series were also taken 
from Datastream. Only data from Phase II was examined, since in essence, in Phase I 
and Phase II, the underlying for the futures – emission allowances – were 
fundamentally different assets. One EUA granting the right to emit 1 tonne of CO2 only 
in Phase I and the other granting the right for Phase II and onwards. The difference is 
clearly illustrated also by the price series given in Appendix 3. In the case of EUA, the 
time series runs from 15 April 2008 (start of trading of the spot on NordPool in Phase 
II) to 15 April 2009. The CER spot price series is available for the period 12 August 
2008 to 15 April2009. 
All testing was based on daily closing prices. The 12-month Euro Interbank Offered 
Rate (Euribor) is used as an approximation of the interest rate everywhere, except for 
the 2008 theoretical futures prices for which the interest rate was interpolated from 11 
quoted consecutive Euribor rates starting from 1 week up until 8 months (rates for 1-3 
weeks and 1-8 months).  
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3.3 Empirical Results 
3.3.1 The Cost-of-Carry Model and Convenience Yields 
 
At the beginning of Phase II the EUA market was in normal backwardation (expected 
future prices were above the market prices), which in November 2008 turned into 
normal contango (opposite of backwardation), as shown in Figure 1.  
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
50 100 150 200 250
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
EU
R
Number of days from the start of Phase II
 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
MSE1 (%) 0,0109 0,0600 0,1950 0,4127 0,6996 
Figure 1 
Differences between theoretical and actual futures prices with maturities in the respective years 
written on EUA. The theoretical futures were priced according to the cost-of-carry relationship, 
assuming 0 convenience yields.  
 
However, the differences decreased considerably already in July after the prices started 
their downward trend in Phase II (see Appendix 1 and 3). The corrections in the market 
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reveal the market participants’ perception about the shortage of allowances, which was 
reduced due to the bleak economic growth anticipation. Further on, it was exacerbated 
by liquidity problems among companies, which made a futures position more desirable 
compared to the spot, in the hope of better cash flows matching, i.e. by selling the 
permits now and buying them back when sales are expected to increase again. The 
difference between the spot and December 2012 futures has increased more relative to 
other futures at the end of the studied period, showing some of the market participants’ 
strategy to take advantage of the current underpriced situation and enter into an 
agreement to buy the EUAs in 2012 in order to transfer these into Phase III, which is 
expected to have a significant shortage of allowances. 
The price of the Dec08 futures did converge to the spot price deviating on average 
0.8%. Considering the market microstructure this would probably still be in the no-
arbitrage bounds. MSE calculations (provided in Figure 1) further imply the fit to the 
cost-of-carry model. 
As shown in Figure 2, the implied convenience yields appear to have a ‘term structure’ 
in the futures market (though coinciding in the second quarter of the observed period), 
despite moving stochastically in time. The volatility in convenience yields clearly 
increased after the market turned into normal contango. There are clear downward-
sloping convenience ‘yield curves’ both at the beginning and at the end of the analysed 
period. While the latter was explained previously (with the liquidity trap), the 
beginning of the period, when the market was bullish, contradicts the intuitive 
explanation: the further in time the futures delivery is, the more exposed to market 
movements one is and the more beneficial from a risk management and arbitrage point 
of view it should be to hold a spot. Nonetheless, since emission permits are needed for 
the production process only once a year (for compliance in April) and are bankable, the 
phenomenon can possibly be explained by the fact that there was much more 
unawareness about the actual emissions in the first half of the phase. Moreover, it is the 
first time during the EU ETS that economies are in recession, which could have been 
already incorporated into the expectations, adding even more to the perceived 
uncertainties.  
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Figure 2 
Convenience yields implied from the futures prices maturing in December 2009, 2010, 2011 
and 2012 written on EUA. 
 
The convenience yield implied by the 2008 futures should be 0, as the discounted price 
series should follow the spot price (since, as previously pointed out, both of these could 
be used for compliance in April 2009). Yet, as seen in Figure 3, the convenience yield 
is much more volatile, although it follows the same trend as other implied convenience 
yields. This is so, due to the fact that the interest rate effect is minimised closer to 
maturity and it was pronounced that some differences still persisted between the spot 
and Dec08 futures.   
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Figure 3 
Implied convenience yield from December 2008 futures compared to that from December 2009 
futures. 
 
One-sample t-tests on the implied convenience yield from the Dec08 contract 
confirmed the results in Figure 3 and rejected the 0 mean assumption, contradicting ex 
ante expectations. 
3.3.2 Cointegration Between Spot and Futures 
 
The first step in testing cointegration is to ascertain that the variables have the same 
level of integration. If they do, it can be tested whether they follow the same processes, 
i.e. whether the linear combination between them is stationary. For this purpose, the 
spot and futures prices of both traded permits – EUA and CER – were analysed. In 
addition, it was tested whether adding interest cost (interest rate times the time-to-
maturity) to the cointegrating vector can help explain the long-run relationships, thus, 
in essence strictly testing the cost-of-carry model with zero convenience yield. 
Testing for Unit Root in the Time Series 
 
Three different unit root tests, Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Philips-Perron (PP) 
and GLS modified Dickey-Fuller (DF-GLS), were used to test whether the asset prices 
follow a random walk (have a unit root) or are mean reverting in the long term 
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(stationary). Further, it would be interesting to test whether the data is integrated of 
order one, i.e. I(1), or has an even higher order of integration.  
All unit root tests, reported in Appendix 6, fail to reject non-stationarity in level values 
for EUA spot and futures prices as well as for the interest rate (12-month Euribor) for 
the respective time periods. The same applies for CER as demonstrated in Appendix 8. 
However, the same tests reject it in all cases of first differences. Hence, all the observed 
time series are difference stationary integrated of order one. In conclusion, the 
necessary condition for the cointegration analysis is satisfied, which allows us to 
proceed to further investigate the relationship between the spot and the futures. 
Testing for Cointegration 
 
Having determined that all the price series are I(1), it can now be tested, whether they 
follow the same stochastic trend, i.e. whether the difference between them is mean-
reverting in the long run. The EUA Dec11 futures were chosen for this purpose. The 
reasoning behind this is that due to the absence of listed Phase III futures, Dec12 
futures somewhat carry this purpose due to bankability. Furthermore, since the Dec11 
futures deviate the most from their theoretical values (after Dec12 futures) proving 
cointegration in this specific case would suggest that this might hold in the case of 
shorter-term futures as well.  
To prove cointegration, one has to prove that the obtained residuals (ut) in equation (5) 
are stationary. Hence, the same procedures are followed as in the case of testing the 
unit root in the price series. However, the critical values of the tests will be changed 
due to the fact that regressing level values might lead to spurious regressions (Hill et al. 
2007). Further, the Johansen test, a more sophisticated measure, is used to verify these 
results, while the Engle-Granger test results are provided more for the purpose of 
intuitive explanations.  
Firstly, the case of EUA is considered. When testing cointegration simply between 
EUA spot and futures values according to equation (5), unit root tests are not able to 
reject non-stationarity in the residuals, even when interest cost (interest rate – 
approximated by the 12-month Euribor – times time-to-maturity) is added to the 
cointegrating equation (see Appendix 9). Hence, with the Engle-Granger methodology 
one cannot reject the null-hypothesis of non-stationarity of the residuals and must 
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conclude that the EUA spot and the December 2011 futures prices are not cointegrated, 
although the visual inspection of the price series, shown in Appendix 5, definitely 
suggests that there is a strong relationship between the spot and the futures. 
To further check these results, Johansen cointegration test was carried out, with the 
results in Appendix 10. Though, in a two variable setting the results should not be 
significantly different from those attained with the Engle-Granger method (Alexander 
2001), which indeed confirm the unit root tests, whereas in the three variable case 
(when adding interest cost to the relationship, computed as before), the Johansen test 
reports the existence of one cointegrating relationship. Therefore, adding the interest 
cost to the system does somewhat help explain the relationship between the spot and 
futures, due mainly to the recent drastic changes in interest rates due to the financial 
markets’ situation.   
An error correction model can finally be fitted. First, the long run, cointegrating 
relationship is estimated by the Johansen procedure:  
tIntCostFS EUAt
EUA
t 0008.09512.0ln9931.01174.0ln −−+=                    (6) 
                                    (-15.36)*                (1.9)*** 
 
where lnSt and lnFt are the spot and futures values of EUA in natural logarithms and 
IntCost denotes interest cost. The t-statistics, given in parentheses, show that the latter 
two are significant at the 1% and the 10% level, respectively.. The interest cost is 
calculated as before, i.e. the interest rate for the respective period (approximated by the 
12-month Euribor) times time-to-maturity, i.e. rt(T-t).  
 
The short-term dynamics between the observed variables (reported in Table 2) are 
obtained by regressing, in a fashion similar to the system of equation (4), the changes in 
the variables (differenced values) on the lagged changes in all of the variables together 
with the lagged errors from the equation (6).  
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EUA ∆lnS
 t  ∆lnF t  ∆IntCost t 
 Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
et-1 -0.1687    -1.80***  -0.1436    -1.59  -0.0091 -3.58* 
∆lnS
 t-1 -0.0129 -0.04  0.2512 0.90  0.0083 1.07 
∆lnF
 t-1 0.1074 0.36  -0.1447 -0.50  -0.0079 -0.98 
IntCost
 t-1 0.2736 0.12  0.1321 0.06  0.3379  5.61* 
trend  0.0000 0.04  0.0000 -0.05  0.0000 -3.78* 
cons -0.0002 -0.05  0.0000 -0.01  0.0002   2.42** 
Table 2 
Vector Error Correction Model on EUA: Estimating effects from the lagged values. The 
appropriate lag order was chosen based on the Schwarz Bayesian information criterion (SBIC).  
*sig at the 1% level 
**sig at the 5% level 
***sig at the 10% level 
 
The error term (denoted et-1 in the table) shows no significance in explaining the EUA 
futures prices and is significant only at the 10% level in explaining the EUA spot price 
(denoted ∆lnS), thus confirming the statistical testing and implying that the 
cointegrating relationship between the EUA spot and futures prices is relatively weak. 
However, the error term does have a highly significant impact on the interest cost 
(denoted ∆IntCost). Furthermore, there exists no significant lead-lag relationship 
between the spot and the futures (it is possible that using intraday data would change 
this result).  
The reasons behind the weak relationship can be twofold. Firstly, as brought up before, 
stochastic convenience yields can affect the link between spot and futures. Figure 3 
shows that there is a shift in convenience yield from positive to negative values at the 
end of 2008, which should be reflected in the residuals from the cointegrating vector. 
As presented in Appendix 5, Panel B, major discrepancies in the relationship between 
the log-prices still exist in the first half of the time period, exhibiting no similarities 
with the trend of the convenience yield (this is illustrated by the bivariate case, though 
adding interest cost to the relationship does not change the picture significantly). 
Secondly, when calculating the implied convenience yields, according to the cost-of-
carry model, the unit slope is imposed to the relationship between the spot and the 
future. Hence, it might just be that the coefficient, through which the asset prices are 
related, has been subject to change over the time period, which in this case seems to be 
the more reasonable inference. 
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Next, cointegration in the other exchange-traded permit in the EU ETS – CER – will 
also be analysed here. A quick glance at the price series presented in Appendix 7 
reveals that the CER spot and December 2011 futures follow practically the same path 
after some convergence at the beginning of Phase II. In addition, based on the unit root 
tests as well as the stationarity test on residuals reported in Appendix 9, cointegration 
can be proved to exist between the spot and the futures even without adding any 
interest cost to the relationship. Furthermore, the Johansen test in Appendix 10 clearly 
confirms that there does exist a cointegrating relationship both with and without 
interest cost. However, based on the information criteria undoubtedly the model 
including the interest cost should be preferred, and as it is of interest to test the cost-of-
carry model, the long-term relationship between CER and the following variables was 
estimated2: 
tIntCostFS CERt
CER
t 0004.09974.0ln8080.03312.0ln +++=                 (7) 
                                        (-26.14)*                (-3.23)* 
 
where the variables have an identical interpretation as in the EUA case. Consequently, 
since the tests unanimously prove the existence of cointegration, an error correction 
model can be estimated. Table 3 reports the results.   
CER ∆lnS
 t  ∆lnF t  ∆IntCost t 
 Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
e
 t-1 -0,6998  -4,57*  -0,4766 -2,91*  -0,0049   -1,88*** 
∆lnS
 t-1 0,2703 1,58  0,5202 2,85*  0,0039 1,35 
∆lnF
 t-1 -0,0937 -0,57  -0,3482  -1,99**  -0,0030 -1,06 
IntCost
 t-1 -3,7529 -1,08  -3,1518 -0,84  0,6942  11,60* 
trend  0,0000 -0,27  0,0000 0,37  0,0000 -0,19 
cons 0,0024  0,44  -0,0029 -0,49  -0,0002   -1,88*** 
Table 3 
Vector Error Correction Model on CER: Estimating effects from the lagged values. The 
appropriate lag order was chosen based on the Schwarz Bayesian information criterion (SBIC).  
*sig at the 1% level 
**sig at the 5% level 
***sig at the 10% level 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Again using the Johansen procedure. 
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The error terms (denoted et-1), or the short run deviations from a long-run equilibrium, 
have negative coefficient values, -0.6998 for the spot returns (denoted ∆lnSt), -0.4766 
for the futures returns (denoted ∆lnFt) and -0.0049 for the changes in the interest cost 
(denoted ∆IntCostt), significant at the 1%, 1% and 10% level, respectively. This 
implies that in the case of a shock the spot and futures prices move at a fairly fast rate 
back towards the mean reverting equilibrium level, while the interest cost has a less 
important role in the relationship.  
Another even more important result in this context is that on the CER market, the spot 
price Granger-causes or leads the futures prices at the 99% confidence level. This 
means that the spot log-returns can explain or forecast the futures log-returns (at least 
the futures maturing in 2011). As indicated before, this is more typical for the energy 
commodity markets and is a sign of rigid supply and that the market is not efficient 
(Alexander 2001). However, it should be noted that the market is relatively young 
(covering slightly more than 160 observations here) and also fairly illiquid. This could 
also explain the results and, the phenomenon may therefore be subject to change. 
However, one aspect that might influence the results is the fact that the CER spot and 
futures are traded on different exchanges (on BlueNext and NordPool, respectively). 
Benz and Klar (2008) find some evidence that in the case of EUA, exchanges that are 
more liquid and have lower transaction costs react faster to new information, although, 
the less liquid exchange to some extent also contributed to the price discovery. 
Since all tests, as well as the Vector Error Correction model, indicate that the CER spot 
and futures prices are indeed cointegrated - follow the same trend in the long run - it 
can be tested whether these are related through the cost-of-carry model. From equation 
(3), it can be seen that in the estimated model it should hold that 
           )(1ln1ln tTrFS ttt −−=                      (8) 
 
In other words, it should be tested whether the coefficients for the log futures price and 
the interest cost are equal to 1 and –1, respectively. However, the positive near unity 
coefficient value for the interest cost in the equation (7) allows rejection of the cost of 
carry model for CER futures pricing without any formal testing. This is also indicated 
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by the relatively week correlations by the 12-month Euribor and CER futures prices  
(as compared to EUA), which are presented in Appendix 4. 
When looking at equation (6), the EUA futures prices seem to evolve in accordance 
with the cost-of-carry model. Nevertheless, for this relationship to hold, the condition 
of cointegration must be satisfied, for which, as previously proved, the results are rather 
mixed. 
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Conclusion 
 
The market price of emitting carbon dioxide is fairly volatile and highly dependent on 
the so-called market fundamentals (such as the demand for energy commodities and 
extreme changes in weather), because of the vertical supply curve of allowances. 
Nevertheless, the most important factors from risk management perspective are still the 
institutional factors or regulatory risk related to the future design of the scheme, the 
most relevant being how large the total cap set in Phase III will be. Other factors are 
how the allowances will be auctioned and, more importantly, whether, how and when 
the EU ETS will be linked to the flexible mechanisms, JI and CDM, and other emission 
trading schemes. In any case, a shortage of allowance can be expected to be 
considerable in Phase III and will probably occur also in Phase II. The aforementioned 
risk factors, however, will have substantial impact on the prices in the mid-term. 
In conclusion, forecasting the carbon price is quite a challenging task. 
A more relevant question from a compliant’s perspective is how to effectively hedge 
the carbon risk. For this purpose, the futures market was investigated, based on futures 
written on EUA and CER, maturing in December 2011. To my knowledge, this is the 
first study on relationships between the CER spot and futures prices and the first study 
on EUA in Phase II. While some previous papers have studied the Phase II futures 
previously (e.g. Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner 2007), their results are dubious, since 
they used the Phase I spot price for pricing the futures contracts.  
At a first glance, the econometric analysis shows that the EUA futures prices seem to 
develop according to the standard cost-of-carry model. Nevertheless, for this 
relationship to hold, there must be cointegration between the variables, for which there 
were not very many strong arguments. The futures in Phase II have turned from normal 
backwardation to normal contango and convenience yields implied by the EUA futures 
have evolved rather stochastically while exhibiting ‘term structure’. However, the 
evidence suggests that it is the change in the direct relationship between the spot and 
the futures, rather than the stochastic convenience yield that makes the tests fail to 
prove cointegration.  
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In contrast, statistical testing revealed that there definitely is a strong cointegrating 
relationship between the CER spot and futures prices (as well as the interest cost), 
though the prices are definitely not related through a cost-of-carry relationship.  
While the EUA price series in Phase I exhibited extreme volatilities due to the 
regulatory issues and lack of experience in the market, carbon prices have shown wide 
swings in Phase II as well, due mainly to changing perceptions about the level of 
emissions during the recession and liquidity problems among companies caused by the 
credit crisis. Yet, despite all the uncertainties, it is very unlikely that a structural break 
(or price collapse) like the one at the end of Phase I will happen in the future due to the 
guaranteed and unlimited bankability of EUAs (at least until 2020). 
Based on the first year of Phase II of the EU ETS, it can be nevertheless concluded that 
the futures market does, in the end, provide reasonably effective hedging opportunities 
(though the statistical tests do not all confirm this due to the rough start in Phase II). 
Hopefully, the recent trend of liquidity traders entering the market will also make 
options a more useful hedging tool, which is especially important in the light of all the 
possible scenarios of the market development. 
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Appendices 
 
  Appendix 1 
Daily Spot Prices 
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Panel A: Daily closing spot prices of EUA from the beginning of the EU ETS traded on 
NordPool (24 October 2005-15 April 2009) and CER prices from BlueNext (12 August 2008-
15 April 2009). 
 
Panel B: Volume of EUA traded from the beginning of the EU ETS traded on NordPool (24 
October 2005-15 April 2009) 
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Appendix 2 
EUA Daily Log-returns 
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Panel A: Nordpool daily log-returns of EUA in Phase I and II (24 October 2005-15 April 
2009) 
 
Panel B: Nordpool daily log-returns of EUA zoomed in on Phase II (15 April 2008-15 
April 2009) 
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Appendix 3 
Daily Futures Prices and Volume 
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Panel A: The three futures prices are chosen from NordPool for illustrative purposes:  
EUADEC07 - futures on EUA maturing in Dec 2007 (in Phase I),  
EUADEC11 - futures on EUA maturing in Dec 2011 (in Phase II), and  
CERDEC11 - futures on CER also maturing in Dec 2011.  
The vertical line in the graph refers to the start of Phase II.  
 
Panel B: Shows volumes traded in the financial market of the CO2 allowances (futures written 
on EUA and CER) on NordPool that were traded in the respective time points ranging from 
deliveries in 2005 up until 2012.    
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Appendix 4 
Correlations 
 
Matrix I 
 Electricity     0.9127   0.9096   0.8364   0.9019   0.8318   1.0000
 Natural_Gas     0.8218   0.8314   0.7004   0.8363   1.0000
        Coal     0.9216   0.9184   0.8974   1.0000
         Oil     0.9000   0.8933   1.0000
         CER     0.9947   1.0000
         EUA     1.0000
                                                                    
                    EUA      CER      Oil     Coal Natura~s Electr~y
 
 
  
Matrix II 
     EURIBOR     0.9362   0.9500   0.9388   0.9374   0.9376   0.9371   1.0000
   EUADEC_12     0.9962   0.9534   0.9981   0.9991   0.9997   1.0000
   EUADEC_11     0.9975   0.9539   0.9991   0.9997   1.0000
   EUADEC_10     0.9987   0.9545   0.9997   1.0000
   EUADEC_09     0.9995   0.9558   1.0000
   EUADEC_08     0.9560   1.0000
    EUA_spot     1.0000
                                                                             
               EUA_spot EUADE~08 EUADE~09 EUADE~10 EUADE~11 EUADE~12  EURIBOR
 
 
 
Matrix III 
     EURIBOR     0.8749   0.8733   0.8583   0.8547   0.8468   0.8513   1.0000
   CERDEC_12     0.9812   0.9863   0.9957   0.9981   0.9990   1.0000
   CERDEC_11     0.9856   0.9900   0.9977   0.9994   1.0000
   CERDEC_10     0.9887   0.9928   0.9992   1.0000
   CERDEC_09     0.9915   0.9955   1.0000
   CERDEC_08     0.9976   1.0000
     CER_PNX     1.0000
                                                                             
                CER_PNX CERDE~08 CERDE~09 CERDE~10 CERDE~11 CERDE~12  EURIBOR
 
  
 
 
Matrix I and III contain correlations over the time period from 12 August 2008-15 April 2009 
(trading period of CER on BlueNext).  
Matrix II is calculated over the period from 15 April 2008-15 April 2009 (trading period of 
EUA in Phase II on NordPool).  
 
Oil is the Brent Crude oil spot price on FOB terms. Coal is from South-Africa on FOB terms. 
Electricity is the daily average electricity system price on NordPool. Natural gas is from the 
Henry Hub. All the EUA spot and futures, as well as the CER futures prices are the daily 
closing prices from NordPool. The CER spot price is the closing price from BlueNext. Euribor 
represents the 12-month rate. 
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Appendix 5 
EUA Price Series 
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Panel A: NordPool EUA spot and Dec 2011 futures values in natural logarithms  
 
Panel B: ‘Actual’ shows the EUA spot price, and ‘fitted’ is the value of the EUA spot 
predicted by OLS regression on 2011 futures (with a constant added). ‘Residuals’ represents 
the difference between the actual and fitted values. 
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Appendix 6 
Unit Root Tests on EUA 
 
  Unit root tests 
  ADF specification PP specification DF-GLS lag (min MAIC) 
Level values (in natural logs) p-value   p-value   t-statistic by DF-GLS 
EUA_spot 0.2149 drift, lag 1  0.6709 trend, default lags  -1.415 1 
EUADEC_08 0.6357 drift, lag 0  0.8299 trend, default lags -0.961 1 
EUADEC_09 0.1903 drift, lag 4  0.6988 trend, default lags -1.534  4 
EUADEC_10 0.1847 drift, lag 4  0.6699 trend, 10 lags -1.512  4 
EUADEC_11 0.1660 drift, lag 10 0.7247 trend, default lags -1.385 11 
EUADEC_12 0.1815 drift, lag 4  0.7188 trend, default lags -1.534  4 
EURIBOR - 12M  0.5834 drift, lag 5 0.1090 trend, lag 1 -0.094 5 
First differences     
 
  
 EUA_spot 0.0000 drift, lag 0  0.0000 drift, lag 0 (-11.26)* 9 
 EUADEC_08 0.0000 drift, lag 0 0.0000 drift, lag 0 (-7.165)*  13 
 EUADEC_09 0.0000 drift, lag 0  0.0000 drift, lag 0 (-10.715)* 15 
 EUADEC_10 0.0000 drift, lag 0 0.0000 drift, lag 0 (-10.780)* 15 
 EUADEC_11 0.0000 drift, lag 0 0.0000 drift, lag 0 (-10.669)* 15 
 EUADEC_12 0.0000 drift, lag 0 0.0000 drift, lag 0 (-10.453)* 15 
 EURIBOR - 12M  0.0000 drift, lag 0  0.0000 drift, lag 0 (-6.185 )* 11 
*sig at the 1% level 
**sig at the 5% level 
***sig at the 10% level 
 
The test results for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) are given by 
the Mackinnon approximate p-values, while for the Generalized Least Squares modified 
Dickey-Fuller (DF-GLS) test only test-statistics are provided.  
 
All the EUA spot and futures values (not the 12-month Euribor) have been converted into 
natural logarithms. The first difference refers also to differences in consecutive natural 
logarithmic values. The specification column contains information about the process used to 
obtain the presented (lowest) p-values. 
 
Tests on level values test the null hypothesis of I(1) versus I(0), while the tests on first 
differences test the null hypothesis of I(2) versus I(1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
40
Appendix 7 
CER Price Series 
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Panel A: NordPool CER spot and Dec 2011 futures values in natural logarithms  
 
Panel B: ‘Actual’ shows the CER spot price, and ‘fitted’ is the value of the CER spot predicted 
by OLS regression on 2011 futures (with a constant added). ‘Residuals’ represents the 
difference between the actual and fitted values. 
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Appendix 8 
Unit Root Tests on CER 
 
  Unit root tests 
  ADF specification PP specification DF-GLS lag (min MAIC) 
Level values (in natural logs) p-value   p-value   t-statistic by DF_GLS 
CER_PNX 0.1566 drift, lag 2 0.6997 trend, lag 2 -2.054  2 
CERDEC_08 0.5014 drift, lag 1  0.5027 trend, lag 2  -1.561 1 
CERDEC_09 0.6809 drift, lag 1  0.6776 drift, default -1.864 2 
CERDEC_10 0.1082 drift, lag 1  0.6635 no trend lag 1 -1.803  1 
CERDEC_11 0.0820 drift, lag 12 0.6636 no trend lag 1 -1.603 2 
CERDEC_12 0.6560 drift, lag 1  0.6545 drift, default -1.692  1 
EURIBOR - 12M  0.2078 drift, lag 5 0.7601 trend, lag 2 -1.199 2 
First differences        
CER_PNX 0.0000 trend, lag 3 0.0000 no trend, lag 3 (-5.369)* 3 
CERDEC_08 0.0000 drift, lag 1 0.0000 trend, lag 1 (-5.827)* 3 
CERDEC_09 0.0000 drift, lag 1 0.0000 drift, default (-9.171)* 3 
CERDEC_10 0.0000 drift, lag 1 0.0000 trend, lag 1 (-8.880)* 3 
CERDEC_11 0.0000 trend, lag 1 0.0000 trend, lag 1 (-5.391 )* 3 
CERDEC_12 0.0000 drift, lag 1 0.0000 drift, default (-8.819)* 3 
EURIBOR - 12M  0.0007 drift, lag 1 0.0020 trend, lag 5 (-2.938)*** 5 
*sig at the 1% level 
**sig at the 5% level 
***sig at the 10% level 
 
The test results for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) are given by 
the Mackinnon approximate p-values, while for the Generalized Least Squares modified 
Dickey-Fuller (DF-GLS) test only test-statistics are provided.  
 
All the CER spot and futures values (not the 12-month Euribor) have been converted into 
natural logarithms. The first difference refers also to differences in consecutive natural 
logarithmic values. The specification column contains information about the process used to 
obtain the presented (lowest) p-values. 
 
Tests on level values test the null hypothesis of I(1) versus I(0), while the tests on first 
differences test the null hypothesis of I(2) versus I(1). 
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Appendix 9 
Unit Root Tests on Residuals 
 
Panel A: EUA 
 
EUA Test statistics Critical values 
Spot and futures  10% 5% 1% 
   ADF -2,290 -3,0657 -3,3654 -3,9618 
   PP -2,536 -3,0657 -3,3654 -3,9618 
   KPSS 0,246 0,231 0,314 0,533 
Spot, futures and interest cost  10% 5% 1% 
   ADF -2,578 -3,4494 -3,7675 -4,3078 
   PP -2,839 -3,4494 -3,7675 -4,3078 
   KPSS 0,248 0,163 0,221 0,38 
 
Panel B: CER 
 
CER Test statistics Critical values 
Spot and futures  10% 5% 1% 
   ADF -3.651 -3.0657 -3.3654 -3.9618 
   PP -4.618 -3.0657 -3.3654 -3.9618 
   KPSS 0.316 0.231 0.314 0.533 
Spot, futures and interest cost  10% 5% 1% 
   ADF -4.490 -3,4494 -3,7675 -4,3078 
   PP -5.383 -3,4494 -3,7675 -4,3078 
   KPSS 0.229 0,163 0,221 0,38 
 
Where: 
ADF - Augmented Dickey-Fuller test  
PP - Phillips-Perron test 
KPSS - Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test 
 
The critical values for the unit root tests in case of regressing variables of I(1), i.e. regressing 
level values of variables with a unit root, were obtained from Phillips and Ouliaris (1990) for 
the demeaned case. The KPSS test is a complement to the unit root tests, where the posed null 
hypothesis is that the data is stationarity (as opposed to the unit root tests where the non-
stationarity is tested). The KPSS critical values for residual testing are from Shin (1994).  
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Appendix 10 
The Johansen Test  
 
Commodity Model   
Null 
Hypothesis   
Trace 
Statistic   
5% Critical 
value 
EUA Spot, futures   r=0   12.8226*      18.17 
  
    r=1   3.9496        3.74 
  Spot, futures, interest cost  r=0  33.7868  29.68 
  
    r=1   10.4018*   15.41 
CER Spot, futures   r=0   21.0638       18.17 
  
    r=1   2.6287*       3.74 
  Spot, futures, interest cost  r=0  40.6294       34.55  
      r=1   8.4425*      18.17 
 
The trace statistics show the results of testing the hypotheses of ranks, i.e. the maximum 
number of cointegrating relationships between the variables. The asterisks indicate the ranks 
assigned by the test, meaning that the respective null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The lag 
orders for the test were chosen based on different information criteria and on significance of the 
lagged values in the VECM. In addition, a trend was added in every case. 
  
 
 
  
 
